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This paper examines the process of the firm - labor 
bargaining relationship by concentrating primarily on the 
pervasive economic theory of asymmetric information. A fairly 
comprehensive explanation of asymmetric information is provided, 
along with a series of asymmetric information examples. Included 
in the discussion of asymmetric information are explanations of a 
few of its subtopics: moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Following the explanation of asymmetric information, a model 
of the firm - labor bargaining relationship is provided. Firms, 
labor unions, negotiations and their respective roles are 
highlighted. 
This model is then combined with the theory of asymmetric 
information to give a thorough explanation of the bargaining 
process and the intricacies of negotiations. The informational 
struggles which both the labor unions and firms experience 
receive particular attention. Next, an outline of the bargaining 
process is provided. 
Lastly, in a case study of the National Football League, 
the negotiations between the league and its players is examined. 
This model explores free agency and benefit negotiations 
undertaken by both parties in the NFL relationship as an 
application of asymmetric information. 
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~. One of the major concerns of the business community in the 
-
-. 
industrial and post industrial ages has been relations with 
labor. More specifically, the determination of wage levels, 
development of benefit packages, and creation of contracts have 
all been areas of concentration for both labor and management. 
With the arrival of labor unions and collective bargaining, the 
entire process of contract negotiation has become even more 
complicated -- and controversial. 
As is expected when an area of life or business becomes 
important, it is studied; studying the firm - labor relationship 
has become a popular pastime (and occasionally, occupation) for 
economists. This paper examines the process of the firm - labor 
bargaining relationship by concentrating primarily on the 
pervasive theory of asymmetric information and its offshoots, 
establishing the theory's necessity and value in terms of under-
standing the firm - labor relationship, and by examining the 
principal aspects of the firm - labor bargaining model. This 
model is then applied to a case study using the National Football 
League and its negotiations with the National Football League 
Players' Association (the players' union). 
Asymmetric Information 
Essential to understanding the firm - labor bargaining model 
is the theory of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information 
is the primary assumption contained in most models. 
Asymmetric information can best be understood by first 
examining two classical welfare theorems authored by Arrow and 
Debreu -- known as the Arrow - Debreu Model. This model assumes 
perfect information, and states, 
"(1) •.• under suitable assumptions on the preferences of 
consumers and the production possibilities of producers, 
the allocation of resources in a competitive equilibrium 
is optimal in the sense of Pareto . . . , (2) and 
conversely every Pareto - optimal allocation of resources 
can be realized by a competitive equilibrium." (Arrow and 
Debreu 265) 
with perfect or symmetric information and competitive 
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bargaining conditions an efficient competitive outcome is guaran-
teed in the sense of Pareto, and every possible Pareto - optimal 
resource allocation can be achieved through competitive bargain-
ing. Arrow and Debreu assert further that the second theorem 
inherently provides that each individual can supply some sort of 
product (i.e. labor), and that each type of labor has a produc-
tivity factor in the creation of goods (266). 
Pareto optimality, as used in the theorems presented above, 
is a synonym for economic efficiency in the sense that the 
resource allocation is "efficient"; i.e. there is no other 
feasible allocation that makes one party better off without 
making the other or others worse off (Holmstrom and Myerson 
1799). In other words, no other bargaining agreement can be 
reached ex post that benefits one party without lowering the 
utility level of another party. 
If one assumes away all transaction costs, the key to this 
Arrow - Debreu Model is the assumption of symmetric information. 
This means that each party knows his competitor's preferences 
perfectly; he knows the profitability and quality of the product 
and all processes; he knows the current market conditions; he 
knows his own preferences, abilities, value, and earnings poten-
tial in his next best alternative; and he knows all other infor-
mation relevant to the bargaining process. Therefore, according 
to Arrow and Debreu, with the assumptions made above, every 
competitive bargaining agreement would be efficient and Pareto -
optimal. 
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This assumption concerning symmetric information is demon-
strated by Rubenstein in his model that explores the division of 
a pie between two parties. In the pie example, both parties have 
perfect information concerning the other's preferences and the 
size of the pie. The two parties must agree on how the pie is to 
be divided. Rubenstein shows that invariably the first suggested 
division method will be accepted by both parties (i.e. it is 
Pareto - optimal and efficient) (Rubenstein 99). 
Carrying these theories into a market setting, Rooth and 
Cressy assert that the assumption of symmetric information 
implies that both parties (or more) to a contract will know the 
outcome before embarking on a costly bargaining struggle. If 
both parties are rational, they will, therefore, agree to terms 
ex ante before incurring the costs of bargaining (Rooth and 
Cressy 269). Why then does the market "break down" and not 
achieve these efficiencies? Why do lengthy bargaining struggles 
even exist? The commonly accepted answer to this question is: 
asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information, an economic phenomenon, occurs when 
a party does not possess all relevant information concerning a 
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realized or potential agreement. Using Rubenstein's pie as an 
example, one party may not know how much another likes or dislike 
the pie they are dividing. One or both parties may not know the 
size of the pie. One or both parties may not know the highest 
valued alternative use of the pie; the possibilities for asymmet-
ric information are too many to enumerate. But, one can see how 
bargaining becomes necessary when one possesses imperfect infor-
mation. 
Two more specific examples of asymmetric information are 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Both are encountered often 
in the firm - labor bargaining model. 
Moral hazard can be explained by looking at a principal -
agent relationship where the principal is the employer of the 
agent, and the actions of the agent affect the well-being of the 
principal. Moral hazard exists when the actions of the agent are 
undertaken to maximize the agent's own utility, to the detriment 
of the principal, where the agent will not incur the full cost of 
the action. (Harris and Raviv 232). 
These cases of moral hazard are exemplified in actions of 
the agent that are hidden or unobservable (McAfee and McMillan 
561). Conversely, moral hazard may also exist in a situation 
where the agent possesses a greater knowledge on a subject than 
the principal. This advantage in information on the part of the 
agent renders the utility of the agent's actions unobservable to 
the principal (i.e. the principal can observe the actions of the 
agent, but the principal does not know if they are in his own 
best interest (asymmetric information).) An example of this 
would exist in a client - attorney relationship where the client 
(the principal) can observe the actions of the attorney (the 
agent), but the client does not know if these actions are in his 
own best interest. 
5 
On the other hand, adverse selection exists when a purchaser 
cannot exactly determine the quality of a good he intends to 
purchase. The selection of goods provides many opportunities for 
adverse selection. 
Inherent in any bundle of goods are some defective units, 
and adverse selection occurs when a purchaser acquires one or 
more of these defective goods when the purchaser did not intend 
to do so. Generally, the only pieces of information available to 
a purchaser are market statistics on the quality of a group of 
similar products. In this case an incentive exists for sellers 
to provide a defective good. The sale of a defective unit 
affects the group statistics, but it does not affect the informa-
tion available concerning the goods available from a specific 
seller (Akerlof 488). Therefore, a seller knows the quality of a 
specific good, but the buyer does not (asymmetric information). 
A hypothetical example of this could exist in a franchised 
fast food restaurant. Most chains of restaurants rely on main-
taining a standard level of quality throughout all of their 
individual restaurants, and most chains employ rigid standardiza-
tion and observational techniques to ensure that each of their 
franchisees is attaining a certain level of quality. The 
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McDonald's franchise is a perfect example of these techniques in 
use. McDonald's has had success by franchising to very limited 
geographical areas. The number of stores an individual franchi-
see is permitted to open in one area is partly determined by how 
closely the owner(s) conforms to the edicts of McDonald's head-
quarters. Ray Kroc summed up this franchising philosophy in 1958 
when he said, "Now, damnit, we are not going to stand for any 
monkey business (from franchisees). These guys want to sign a 
franchise, by God, it is a matter of buyer beware. Once they 
sign it, they are going to conform and we are going to hold to it 
that they do conform." (Love 61) 
As can be s"een from the examples already provided, an 
incentive would exist for the owner of an individual restaurant 
to attempt to subvert some franchise standards in the interest of 
greater profits. The owner would know that the reputation of his 
individual restaurant is generally dependent on the reputation of 
the group of restaurants -- particularly if his is a predominant-
ly tourist clientele. Of course, the chain will take measures to 
prohibit this from happening, but the incentive to the owner does 
exist. Hypothetically, a tourist consumer would choose a partic-
ular restaurant on the basis of its national or regional reputa-
tion. By doing so, the consumer runs the risk of adverse selec-
tion. 
An example of adverse selection concerning the hiring of 
labor specifically has been examined. This example highlights the 
advantage in information a firm can possess over its rival(s) 
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when the firm's employees, who possess firm-specific training, 
have been trained by the employing firm (Chiang and Chiang 176). 
In this case, the firm with the better information can retain the 
employees with a greater ability (as demonstrated through their 
training), and the firm is able to dismiss the less able ones. 
Therefore, the workers in the labor pool that are available to 
the lesser - informed firm(s) are, on average, less qualified 
than those employed by the better - informed firm; a greater 
danger of adverse selection exists for the firm who doesn't train 
its own people (i.e. the firm possesses less or asymmetric 
information.) It can be seen from this example that adverse 
selection is also an information - related malady caused by 
asymmetric information. 
Firm - Labor Bargaining Model 
A model of the firm - labor bargaining relationship has 
evolved over time as economists have continued to study methods 
of agreement between firms and labor. Basic overviews of unions, 
firms, bargaining, and some primary assumptions concerning each 
are given below. 
Labor unions are assumed to link a homogeneous pool of 
workers through a collective bargaining agreement (Fisher 501). 
Unions are charged with operating in the best interest of their 
members, and most are run democratically. Unions are assumed to 
want to achieve the maximum utility for their members without 
bankrupting the firm (Tracy 151). 
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Firms can be any type of business; in this model, one should 
assume that firms employ a pool of laborers who work under 
contract. Firms are assumed to be profit - maximizing; they 
possess a team of management that is generally responsible for 
the workings of the firm. specifically, management is generally 
responsible for employing several laborers at a wage suitable to 
minimize costs to the firm. 
Negotiations are attended generally by management of the 
firm and negotiators from the union. The intent of negotiations 
is to agree on wage levels, benefit packages, etc. that the union 
feels are satisfactory and that the firm feels it can afford 
while staying in business (i.e. normal profits). The agreement 
desired is Pareto - optimal, and serves to resolve a conflict 
confronted by the workers. This conflict is such that the 
workers forgo opportunities (opportunity costs) in order to 
provide labor for the firm, while the firm receives a benefit 
from this labor (Harris and Raviv 234). Compensation in the form 
of wages and benefits provides the consideration for the workers' 
opportunity costs. Workers will continue to provide labor to the 
firm as long as their income, at the margin, is greater than 
their marginal cost (opportunity cost) of providing this labor. 
Both sides in this bargaining situation hold leverage 
against the other. For example, the firm ultimately controls the 
wage provided to labor as well as the individual laborers' very 
employment (by the particular firm). However, labor provides an 
important input to the production process, and the wage offered 
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by the firm is a determinant of the quantity and quality of labor 
the firm can attract and retain. 
strikes are leverage tools that unions may use against firms 
with hopes of convincing the firm to consent to a bargaining 
request. Occasionally, when negotiations reach an impasse or 
"bog down," or when a firm declines to negotiate, a union will 
call for a strike. The strike, in effect, makes the labor of the 
union members unavailable for hire by the firm, thus shutting 
down all or some production for at least a short period. A 
further, more detailed discussion of strikes will be contained in 
the next section. 
Presence of Asymmetric Information in the Bargaining Model 
The theory of asymmetric information is pervasive throughout 
the current economic model of firm - labor bargaining. This 
asymmetry of information is present for both firms and labor; 
neither one possesses perfect information. 
Negotiations serve to perform an information - revealing 
role. Labor needs information about firms for determining what 
level of wages or benefits it can reasonably demand from the 
firm. Negotiations are expected to continue as long as the 
marginal value of the information expected to be received exceeds 
the marginal costs of the negotiations (Tracy 152). 
One primary piece of information labor hopes to discover 
through negotiations is the profitability of the firm (Card 625). 
By determining the profitability of the firm, the union knows how 
much of a wage increase the firm can afford; according to Rooth 
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and Cressy, in the negotiation process " ... information is only 
acquired if the union's demand is rejected by the firm (270)." 
Therefore, the only way for a union to discover the economic 
profits of a firm is to make an offer, knowing that it will be 
rejected. Any offer that is accepted reveals only that the 
profitability of the firm assumed by the union when making the 
offer is higher than was assumed (Samuelson 995). The union 
must, therefore, ". . . weigh up the advantages of a higher wage 
now if the demand is accepted against the advantage of more 
information . . . if the demand is rejected (Rooth and Cressy 
270) ." 
Of course, the firm has an incentive to claim that it is not 
profitable; the only way the union can convince the firm to pay 
the higher wage is through the "penalty" of a strike (assuming 
that a less profitable firm will choose to endure a delay in 
production in favor of paying a higher wage) (Card 626). To 
accomplish this, a union's initial offer may contain a high wage 
level with an agreement not to strike. All following offers may 
contain a lower wage level with a set strike period. By provid-
ing a continuous series of declining offers, the union then hopes 
to find the "true" (or exact) profitability of the firm (Fisher 
501) • 
Another piece of information the union may wish to gather 
on the firm is the firm's "perceived quality." According to 
Giammarino and Nosal, the better is the perceived quality of a 
firm, the more likely it is to produce higher profits. As 
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Giammarino and Nosal state, " ... because of this, low - quality 
firms might find it in their best interest to disguise their true 
quality by paying wages that are consistent with high - quality 
firms ... (160)." If a union can determine the perceived 
quality of a firm or the importance of this perceived quality to 
the firm or industry, the union may be able to use perceived 
quality as a bargaining tool. 
As was stated, asymmetry of information exists for firms as 
well as unions. One example is seen when examining the principal 
- agent relationship between firms and labor. Moral hazard 
exists in this relationship when the efforts of individual 
laborers may not be readily observable by the firm. As McAfee 
and McMillan assert, the principal (the firm) may ensure efforts 
of laborers (agents) close to the full-information ideal. This 
can be done by either using incentive contracts that provide 
rewards to pools of workers for attainment of output goals, by 
using penalty contracts that punish pools of workers for not 
realizing production goals, by profit - sharing, or by employing 
a method of direct observation of the efforts of the individuals 
(often the most costly alternative) (561). Therefore, a firm may 
choose to negotiate an incentive or penalty contract to make up 
for an asymmetry of information. 
Another asymmetry of information exists for the firm in that 
it cannot observe the outside job offers of its employees (Arvin 
99). Tracy has found that strike activity is positively related 
to laborers' outside opportunities (161); contracts may serve as 
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the only method of assuring infrequent turnover of labor. Of 
course, alternatives are often a function of ability, and the 
ability of a worker is only known to himself (McAfee and McMillan 
562). As Perri states, 
"When firms in one sector do not know the ability of 
individual workers and there is a positive relation 
between ability and alternative earnings, then firms 
will tend to pay the same wage to all workers and the 
average abilities of the employed will be positively 
related to the wage . . . the profit - maximizing wage 
may exceed the wage which clears the labor market, 
causing equilibrium unemployment (914)." 
Another danger for firms exists because the ability of a worker 
is known only to himself (McAfee and McMillan 562). Because this 
is the case, the possibility of adverse selection of labor exists 
for the firm. 
The Bargaining Process 
The processes of contract negotiation have been thoroughly 
defined by economists through their studies of firm - labor 
relationships. Two alternative models, or methods, of negotia-
tion have emerged for use by labor unions for information -
determination about a firm. Both models use a schedule of 
offers, but they differ in their methods of offer delivery. 
A sequential bargaining model contains a series of offers 
given over time (Card 627); in this case, a first offer is given, 
and if it is rejected, time passes until a new offer is given. 
According to Hart, it is reasonable to assume that there will be 
a delay between offers because a transaction cost is incurred in 
" making an offer (26); any offer must be discussed by top offi-
cials of either the offering firm or the offering union. The 
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length of time negotiations continue is also said to have an 
effect on the probability of strike occurrence. According to 
Fisher, each month of negotiations increases the probability of a 
strike by 3.7 percent (508). 
A full - commitment model does not allow for a delay between 
offers. Instead, a wage - strike schedule is offered to a firm 
from which the firm is instructed to select a wage level and, if 
called for, the corresponding length of a strike (Card 627). 
Here, the firm is faced with a downward - sloping wage - strike 
schedule. Theoretically, this will induce firms with high 
profitability to choose a higher wage (Card 627, Hart 25). 
Some interesting factors other than wages have been deter-
mined to have an impact on the probability of strike occurrence 
in a negotiating situation. For example, according to Fisher, .. 
. . . a greater variability in firm demand increases the likeli-
hood of a strike ... (508)." This variability causes firms to 
be hesitant to agree to a high wage level when demand may drop, 
thus rendering them unable to afford to pay this higher wage. In 
addition, an increase in the union's uncertainty about the 
profitability of a firm is said to increase the probability of a 
strike (Tracy 150); a strike is therefore more valuable because 
of the information it provides to the uncertain union. 
Case study - National Football Leaque 
A specific, and well - publicized, example of the firm -
labor bargaining model can be seen in the ongoing dispute between 
the National Football League (NFL) and the National Football 
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League Players' Association (NFLPA). The NFL example does not 
mirror the average bargaining situation in that players negotiate 
their own contracts with the teams. Collective bargaining 
concerns itself only with pensions, benefit packages, and general 
operating conditions of the league, but disagreements still exist 
between the players' union and the league. The current dispute 
in the NFL is concerned primarily with benefit packages and free 
agency for the players (King "Players Speak" 58). 
Free agency permits players to choose the team they wish to 
play for. Under free agency, teams are forced to make offers to 
players and compete against one another for the services of a 
particular player. In contrast, as it stands now, after college 
a player is drafted by an NFL team. Subsequently the player 
becomes the property of that team. In most cases, the team 
decides when to trade a player. 
A form of free agency exists in the NFL, but it is available 
only to team - selected players. Currently, a two month free 
agency period does exist after the NFL season is over, but free 
agency is only available to players who are not protected by 
their respective teams. During this two month period, each team 
is permitted to protect thirty - seven of its players (generally 
those that the team considers the most valuable); all other 
players on that team's roster are available to be picked up by 
another team in the league (King "Helps" 114). When a player is 
selected as a free agent from another team, that player is then 
able to negotiate a new contract with the team that selected him. 
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According to Rob st. Clair, Assistant Director of Public Rela-
tions for the Indianapolis Colts of the NFL, in some cases 
players are able to as much as double their salary through this 
information revealing process. However, if the team which chose 
the player does not offer a better package (in the player's 
eyes), the player is free to remain with his original team (st. 
Clair). 
In addition to free agency, the Players' Association wants 
to improve the pension and benefit packages currently held by the 
players. These packages have not been updated since 1982. One 
change the players hope to see is a decrease in the deductible on 
their insurance plan (King "still in Labor" 112). In a Sports 
Illustrated survey, fifty - six percent of the players said that 
improving benefits was their first objective in negotiations with 
the NFL, while thirty-nine percent said establishing free agency 
was their primary objective (King "Players Speak" 58). 
The free agency issue in the National Football League is a 
genuinely unique one. In most industries, there is no ownership 
of employees that restricts movement such as what exists in the 
NFL. The primary complaint of the players is that their inabili-
ty to entertain outside offers keeps their salaries artificially 
low (the average salary in the NFL as of 1991 was $430,000 per 
year (Bernstein 40).) In essence, the players are stating that 
by restricting their movement, the owners are prohibiting them 
from obtaining information about their actual worth to a team. 
Asymmetric information exists for the players because they are 
16 
not permitted to pit teams against one another in bidding for 
their services; therefore, the players are unable to discover 
their true worth. The only bargaining that happens is between a 
player (or his agent) and the team that owns the rights to the 
player. 
The only recourse available to a player who believes he is 
not getting paid what he is worth is to sit out and not play. In 
essence, this constitutes a strike. After a period, the player 
and team will generally reach an agreement. Is the agreement as 
beneficial to the player as it would have been if the player 
could have negotiated with other NFL teams? 
In 1987, the NFL Players' Association called a general 
strike against the teams for the main purpose of forcing the 
owners to permit free agency. However, the owners were able to 
lessen the strike's impact by hiring replacement players, and the 
season continued (Bernstein 40). The strike was plagued by 
players crossing the picket lines, and eventually all the strik-
ing players returned to their teams. The players' strike was 
unsuccessful at trying to determine the profitability of the NFL. 
By using free agency as a condition for the end of the strike, 
the union felt it could ascertain that the league was profitable 
enough to have free agency. By striking, the union hoped to 
force free movement of players into the league rules. Unfortu-
nately for the union, this did not work out as planned, and the 
question of free agency has not been resolved. 
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currently, the Players' Association has turned to other 
methods to try to force the owners to permit free agency. The 
Association has filed lawsuits (not yet decided) claiming that 
the NFL owners are committing antitrust violations by restricting 
the movement of the players. Antitrust laws state that employers 
within an industry may engage in restrictive labor practices if 
the industry's union agrees. The Players' union, according to 
the courts, was agreeing to the current state of affairs by 
conducting collective bargaining with the teams (Bernstein 40). 
In attempts to change this assumed agreement on behalf of 
the Players' Association, the Association stopped functioning as 
a union in late 1989 by not engaging in collective bargaining 
(Bernstein 40). However, the National Labor Relations Board has 
not declared that the Players' Association is no longer a union. 
The Association's success at trial seems to hinge upon whether a 
judge will consider the Players' Association a union (Bernstein 
40) • 
Analysts seem to believe that free agency is going to be a 
reality in the NFL in the near future. The NFL's chief negotia-
tor, Harold Henderson, is proposing a plan where free agency 
would be offered to any player after six or seven years in the 
league. According to his plan, teams would also be forced to 
comply with a salary cap. This salary cap would prohibit teams 
from paying total salaries greater than a certain percentage of 
their total revenue (Bernstein 40). Major League Baseball (MLB) 
and the National Baseball Association (NBA) are both currently 
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using similar plans. If such a plan were enacted in the NFL, 
players would have a much easier time of determining their worth 
and being paid accordingly. Higher salaries for the better 
players would logically follow the adoption of such a plan. with 
higher stakes involved in the bargaining process, the risk of 
adverse selection of labor by the teams would be greater (due to 
higher salaries and freer movement). The quest for information 
on players' abilities would become more intense, and the stakes 
of the NFL bargaining games would grow even higher. 
Summary 
In summary, it can be seen that the firm - labor relation-
ship is generally a complicated one, especially in terms of 
principal - agent contract negotiations. The theory of asymmet-
ric information is a pervasive one throughout this relation-
ship -- even in the National Football League; it resolves many 
questions on apparent inefficiencies of the market, and it 
addresses the need for the bargaining methods employed by both 
firms and unions. Rational explanations or an understanding of 
the firm - labor relationship cannot be achieved without the 
theory of asymmetric information, and for this reason it is so 
valuable. 
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